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I. Introduction 
Most antitrust scholars still hold dear their ban on cartels. Some have 
turned agnostic on resale-price maintenance. Others grant critics their 
exclusionary agreements. Most still insist, though, that horizontal 
agreements to fix prices or quantities are necessarily bad. So it was that 
few agreed when Lester Telser suggested that some such agreements 
might sometimes be efficient. Even as other scholars began to find 
empirical evidence for Telser’s game-theoretic model, few listened.1  
In the article that follows, I trace the logic behind one massive but 
potentially efficient series of agreements to cut production. The logic 
differs from Telser’s “empty-core cycling” game, but similarly suggests 
that the agreement may have generated social gains. At issue is a half-
century’s worth of production-limitation agreements among the giant 
Japanese cotton spinning firms. Although these firms structured the 
agreements as a classic cartel, the logic to the agreements lay not in 
monopoly pricing. Instead, it lay in the economics of “efficiency wages” 
and corporate governance. If the data is specific to Japan, this logic is not. 
Absent an antitrust ban, it suggests similar arrangements might appear in 
many industries everywhere. 
By tradition, Japan specialists accuse the cotton spinning firms of much 
the same sins of which observers accused the Lancashire mills: that they 
exploited their workers by paying them a pittance and exploited 
consumers by fixing prices. The claims probably were not true of 
Richard Epstein, Eric Feldman, Harry First, David Galenson, Michael Huberman, 
William Klein, Geoffrey Miller, Yoshiro Miwa, Clark Nardinelli, Tetsuji Okazaki, Randal 
Picker, Richard Posner, Frances Rosenbluth, Arthur Rosett, Richard Sander, Paul Sheard, 
Richard Smethurst, Haruhito Takeda, David Weinstein, Stephen Yeazell, and participants 
in a workshop at the University of Tokyo Department of Economics. 
1 E.g., Lester G. Telser, Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J. Law & Econ. 271 
(1985); see George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at 
the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J. Law & Econ. 201 (1982) (applying Telser); Stephen Craig 
Pirrong, An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets, 35 J. Law & 
Econ. 89 (1992) (same); Andrew R. Dick, The Competitive Consequences of Japan’s Export 
Cartel Associations, 6 J. Japanese & Int’l Eco. 275 (1992) (same); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl 
Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 107 (1990) 
(efficiencies to horizontal mergers). The best critique of Telser’s model appears in John 
Shepard Wiley Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 556 (1987). These 
models do not apply to the spinning cartel described below for the same reason that the 
monopoly-rent-extracting model does not apply: the firms did not restrict capital 
investments and therefore did not effectively limit production. 
 Lancashire. Neither were they true of Japan. The Japanese mills paid their 
workers double or triple their reservation wage and charged consumers 
market-clearing prices. They did agree to cut production, but not for the 
reasons usually claimed. Instead, they did so to solve a two-pronged 
principal-agent problem: (a) to pay wages high enough to induce their 
workers to “shirk” less, and (b) to prevent their managers from cheating 
on those high wages.  
Like the owners of the large Lancashire mills, the Japanese mill owners 
paid their workers “efficiency wages”—supra-market wages that reduced 
employee shirking by more than the wage increase itself. They apparently 
paid these high wages because of the unfamiliar technology they used. At 
the turn of the century, they used foreign machines in a foreign factory 
system. They knew neither how much to expect from their workers, nor—
given the team character to the production involved—how best to monitor 
those workers. Rather than hire many managers to supervise their 
workers closely, they tried to induce their employees to work hard 
without much monitoring. They did so by raising the penalty workers 
incurred if they lost their job, and they raised that penalty by paying 
double or triple the market-clearing wage.  
These efficiency wages potentially compounded the agency slack 
between the mill owners and their managers. Although the managers left 
some control over major decisions (like large capital investments) with the 
owners, they themselves supervised the daily operations at the firm. 
Necessarily, however, they could give the owners only noisy information 
about the details of factory operations and only incomplete information 
about the industry’s demand curve. In turn, these informational problems 
created an environment where a manager sometimes jeopardized his 
tenure if he reduced his plant’s production. When they did, short-term 
managers had an incentive to operate the plant at full capacity even when 
the reduced demand would have led the owners themselves to idle some 
machines.  
This situation sometimes gave managers an incentive to respond to 
demand shocks by cutting wages. Because the firm intentionally paid 
workers a steady premium over the workers’ shadow wage, it needed 
managers who would respond to demand shocks primarily by cutting 
production. If they instead merely cut wages, workers would eventually 
shirk, productivity would eventually fall, and the firm’s total wage bill 
would eventually rise.  
Managers and investors solved this principal-agent problem through a 
cartel. Through it, the firm’s managers credibly committed themselves to 
 responding to demand shocks by cutting production rather than wages. 
By delegating decisions about production cuts to the cartel’s officers, they 
tied their hands—and protected their firm’s efficiency wage regime from 
themselves.  
At the outset, I summarize the history of cotton spinning in Japan 
(Section II). In Section III, I outline why the cartel that the spinning firms 
established could not have earned them monopoly rents. I conclude by 
using their efficiency wage labor contracts (Section IV.A.) to explain why 
they formed the cartel that they did (Section IV.B.). 
II. The Industry 
A. Cotton History 
Cotton had already been in Japan a millenium when entrepreneurs 
began to import modern spinning machines in the mid-19th Century.2 Not 
that it matters. Japanese farmers never did raise much raw cotton. In the 
middle of the 19th Century they grew 49 million pounds, and by 1887 they 
increased that amount to 67 million. They never grew more. Japanese 
farmers had no comparative advantage in cotton production, and by 1887 
spinners were already importing 10 million pounds. By the end of the 
century they imported almost their entire supply, and the farmers had 
switched to other crops.3 
Even if Japanese farmers could not grow raw cotton competitively, in 
the first decades of this century Japanese spinners and weavers came to 
dominate their sectors of the industry. Half a century earlier, English firms 
had led the industry. For decades, the Crown had punished anyone who 
exported textile machines; by some rumors, it had even hanged them.4 
Perhaps because such threats sometimes work, perhaps for more 
mundane reasons, mid-19th century English firms still had some of the 
best machines, and still dominated the field. 
Things changed. At the turn of the century, Japanese firms adopted 
this British technology. By the 1920s and 30s, they consumed more raw 
2 Some of this introductory material draws on Frances McCall Rosenbluth & J. Mark 
Ramseyer, The Politics of Oligarchy: Endogenizing Institutions in Imperial Japan (unpublished 
MS, 1993). 
3 Takeshi Abe, Men kogyo [The Cotton Industry], in Takeshi Abe and Shunsaku 
Nishikawa (eds.) Sangyoka no jidai [The Age of Industrialization] 163, 170 (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1990); Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 13, 
164, 436 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954). 
4 E.J. Donnell, History of Cotton 12-13 (London: James Sutton & Co, 1872); Seki, supra 
note 3, at 20. 
 cotton than their British competitors and spun more yarn. Domestically, 
they created enormous wealth. By 1930, textile firms produced over a 
quarter of all Japanese manufactured goods and employed over 40 
percent of all factory workers.5 
B. Cotton Crises: 
During the half-century before World War II, firms in the Japanese 
cotton textile industry weathered three major crises: one at the turn of the 
century, one in the early 1920s, and one in the mid-1930s. Toward the end 
of the 1890s, Japanese economic performance dipped badly. Where from 
1886 to 1898 manufacturing volume had doubled, during the four years 
from 1898 to 1902 it fell. When the Boxer Rebellion broke out and Japanese 
firms could no longer sell to China, bad matters simply turned worse. In 
the textile industry, output fell 11 percent from 1898 to 1900, and another 8 
percent from 1900 to 1904.6   
A second crisis hit the cotton firms in 1920. As it had been to many 
firms in many countries, World War I was good to Japanese spinners. 
During the War, many Allied competitors joined the war effort, and even 
those that did not found the sea lanes precarious and the Suez Canal 
closed. In East Asia, all of this dramatically raised cotton prices. From 1916 
to 1919, the price of raw cotton rose 2.7 times, and that of cotton yarn 4.5 
times. Given that raw cotton costs were four-fifths of the price of cotton 
yarn, this price differential gave entrepreneurial spinners a nice profit.7  
For exploiting these high international prices, Japanese spinners found 
themselves well placed—and badly placed for the bust that followed. 
From 1915 to 1919, they watched real profits per spindle more than 
double. When the war ended and prices fell, they watched these profits 
plummet. Granted, they did not do as badly as observers claimed. Cotton 
5 Sanji Muto, Bosekigyo [The Spinning Industry], in Shakai keizai taikei [Overview of Social 
Economics] 5 (no pub. infor.; cat’d in the Univ. of Tokyo Dept. Econ. lib. at 12/120P, 1927) 
(cotton consumption in 1927); Seki, supra note 3, at 60 (yarn production in 1935); id. at 435 
(of all manufacturing workers, 42.5% were in one of the textile industries in 1934-36). 
6  Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino & Akira 0no, Choki keizai tokei: Sen’i kogyo [Long-
Term Economic Statistics: The Textile Industry] 244-45 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
1979); Seisan chosa kai (ed.), Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries] 1 (Tokyo: 
Seisan chosa kai, 1912). 
7  Kusuhei Mihashi (ed.), Toyo boseki kabushiki gaisha yoran [A Survey of the Toyo 
Spinning Corporation] 37-38 (Osaka: Toyo boseki K.K, 1934) (price changes); Nippon 
kangyo ginko chosaka (ed.) Menshi boseki gyo ni kansuru chosa [An Investigation into the 
Cotton Threat Spinning Industry] 43-49 (Tokyo: Nihon kangyo ginko chosaka, 1928) (raw 
cotton cost fraction; as of the late 1920s).  
 yarn prices did fall, but so did raw cotton prices. Nonetheless, as with the 
firms elsewhere that had tried to ride the war-time boom, the spectacular 
wartime profits disappeared. From 1920 to 1926, real profits per spindle 
fell two-thirds (Table 1).8  
The problems arose from two facts. First, not all firms had hedged 
themselves against price changes. Those that had agreed to buy raw 
cotton at the earlier high prices without agreeing to sell at fixed prices 
now lost badly. Second, even firms that had hedged sometimes found the 
protection worthless—for their partners could renege. Although those that 
had contracted to sell high should have done well, they did well only if 
their buyers did not default. Many buyers did. Where the price changes 
had eliminated the buyer’s assets, even courts could not help.9 
A third crisis hit the industry some ten years later. After the general 
financial collapse of 1929-31, many governments began to adopt 
protectionist policies. Some of these policies they designed explicitly 
against Japanese products. Japanese firms, for example, particularly 
threatened British competitors. From 1928 to 1935, Japanese cotton fabric 
exports rose from 1.4 to 2.7 billion square yards, while British exports fell 
from 3.9 to 1.9 billion square yards.10 To slow this competitive shift, 
Commonwealth countries adopted stringent tariffs, and many added 
quantity restraints to boot. By mid-1936, Japanese cotton weavers faced 
trade barriers in a majority of their markets: 56 countries had adopted 
barriers and over half were quotas. By one estimate, the barriers affected 
67 percent of Japanese cotton fabric exports.11 
 
 
Table 1: Profitability in the Cotton Spinning Industry 
 
 Profits/ Profits/ Profits/  
 Firm (¥1000) Spindle ¥1000 Capital 
8 William Lazonick & William Mass, The Performance of the British Cotton Industry, 
1870-1913, 9 Res. Econ. Hist. 1 (1984) (performance of spinning firms in other countries); 
Mihashi, supra note 7, at 37-38 (price data). 
9  Seki, supra note 3, at 43-46 (buyer defaults). 
10 Hiroshi Nishikawa, Nippon teikoku shugi to mengyo [Japanese Imperialism and the 
Cotton Industry] 190 (Kyoto: Minerubwa shobo 1987); Seki, supra note, at 436-41. For the 
debate over the cause of the British decline in cotton spinning, see Lazonick & Mass, 
supra note 8 
11  Fujino, Fujino & 0no, supra note 6, at 244-45; Nishikawa, supra note 10, at 192; R. 
Robson, The cotton Industry in Britain 268 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1957); Seki, supra 
note 3, at 55. 
 1907 629 17.14 354.3 
1908 307 6.17 136.7 
1909 515 8.18 181.8 
1910 203 3.49   79.7 
1911 368 5.77 139.6 
 
1912 547 10.29 232.9 
1913 646 11.77 243.7 
1914  545   8.61 193.9 
1915 741 10.81 249.2 
1916 1431 19.91 415.4 
 
1917 2201 30.93 543.2 
1918 2225 27.43 443.7 
1919 1730 26.78 330.1 
1920 1756 25.78 228.5 
1921 1154 16.92 150.2 
 
1922 1213 17.18 152.5 
1923   780 11.15   88.8 
1924   956 10.99   97.2 
1925   895   9.31   85.1 
1926   862    8.44   78.5 
 
Notes: Total capital is the sum of paid-in capital and accumulated profits. 
Profits are in constant 1934–36 yen. 
 Table 1 cont.: 
Sources: Calculated from data found in Ryokichi Watanabe, Nihon mengyo 
ron [The Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 340-41 (Tokyo: Nippon 
hyoron sha, 1931); Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda, Nobuyuki 
Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada, Minoru Kumazaki, Yoichi Shinoya & 
Ryoshin Minami, Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic Statistics: 
Prices] 135-36 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha,1967).  
 
III. The Cotton Cartel 
A. Organization: 
These crises were not lean years the cotton spinning firms stoically 
endured for the sake of the years of plenty to come. Instead, the firms 
sought safety in numbers. Already in 1882, they had organized themselves 
into the “Great Japan Spinning Federation” (Dai-Nippon Boseki Rengo 
Kai, abbreviated “Boren”). By all accounts, they were the first in the textile 
industry to cartelize. By many accounts, they were among the first in any 
modern Japanese industry to cartelize.12 To them, the Boren now became 
the focus for their efforts to respond to these crises.  
The conventional story is simple enough. Initially, the spinning firms 
used the Boren to gain monopsonistic power in the labor market: to lower 
wages by not bidding for each others’ workers.13 Soon, they used it to gain 
monopolistic power in the product market: to raise profits by enforcing 
quantity restraints. By 1890 they were coordinating reduced operating 
hours, days, and machines (Table 2). Workers and consumers suffered, so 
the story goes, but with no antitrust statute it was all legal. 
Superficially, it was also plausible business strategy. If there had been 
large scale economies, perhaps new firms would have found it hard to 
enter the industry without access to substantial capital.14 If capital markets 
were under-developed, perhaps the new firms could not have obtained 
12 Toshiyuki Shinomiya, Karuteru to sono tokucho [Cartels and Their Characteristics], in 
Keiichiro Nakagawa, Hidemasa Morikawa & Tsunehiko Yui (eds.), Kindai Nihon keiei shi 
no kiso chishiki [Basic Information Regarding Early Modern Japanese Management History] 193-
94 (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1990). 
13 Takahiko Hashimoto, Nippon menshiseki gyo shi nempo [A Time Line for the Japanese 
Cotton Yarn Spinning Industry] 26 (Tokyo: Bunka shi nempyo seisaku kenkyu kai, 1935). 
14  In fact, there were some scale economies. See Table 9, infra. 
 that access except from one of the large conglomerates (the zaibatsu).15 
Given the size of the globe, they arguably could not have entered the 
industry quickly even with the best financial connections. Domestic firms 
did not make competitive spinning machines, after all, until the late 
1920s.16 Before then, a firm intent on undercutting the cartel would have 
had to import its machines from Great Britain or the U.S. 
During the five decades before the War, the spinning firms 
coordinated capacity cuts eleven times (Table 2). They launched the first in 
1890, but disbanded it within a month. They launched the last in 1930, and 
continued it eight years.17 All told, they maintained capacity restraints for 
twenty years. According to Table 3, moreover, production per unit of 
capital equipment did decline. On average, they mandated production 
cuts of about 20 percent. On average, production per spindle fell about 10 
percent. 
 
Table 2: Quantity Restraints in the 
Cotton Spinning Industry, 1890-1930 
 
 Beginning 
 Date  Duration Restraints  
 
1. 1890 Jun. 1 mo. No work for 8 days & nights per mo. 
2. 1899 Jan. 1 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo. 
3. 1900 May 2 mo. Same 
 1900 Jul. 3 mo. Either no night work or a 40% reduction in 
    machines used 
 1900 Oct. 3 mo.  Same 
 1901 Jan. 3 mo.  Same 
4. 1902 Jul.  6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo. 
5. 1908 Jan. 4 mo. No work for 5 days & nights per mo. 
 1908 May  6 mo. Either no night work for 3 months or a 27.5%  
    reduction in machines used for 6 months 
 1908 Nov. 18 mo. 20% reduction in machines used 
 
15 In fact, capital markets were well-developed. See Rosenbluth & Ramseyer, supra 
note 2. 
16 Toshiaki Chokki, Boshoku gyo to koo shita boshokki no hatten [The Development of 
Spinning and Weaving Machines in Response to the Spinning and Weaving Industry], in 
Nakagawa, et al., supra note 12, at 258. 
17  Seki, supra note 3, at 110. 
 Table 2 cont.: 
6. 1910 Oct.   6 mo. Either (i) a 27.5% reduction in machines used  
    or (ii) no night work for 4 days & nights per  
    mo. plus 2 hour reduction per day plus a 12.5% 
     reduction in machines used 
1911 Apr.   6 mo.  Same 
1911 Oct.   6 mo. Either (i) a 10% reduction in machines used or  
  (ii) no work for 5 days & nights per mo. 
1912 Apr.   6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo. 
7. 1914 Aug.   4 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo. and a  
    10% reduction in machines used 
1914 Dec.   8 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo. and a  
   20% reduction in machines used  
1915 Aug.   6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo. and a  
   10% reduction in machines used 
8. 1918 Jan.    6 mo. A 10% reduction either in the machines used  
    or in the days worked 
1918 Jul.   6 mo. Same 
9. 1920 May   1 mo. No work for 6 days & nights per mo. 
1920 Jun.   2 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo., a 10%  
   reduction in the machines used, and a  
   reduction of 4 hrs/day  
1920 Aug. 13 mo. Same, but with a 20% machine cut 
1921 Sept.    3 mo. Same, but 10% machine cut 
10. 1927 May   6 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo., and a  
   reduction of 4 hrs/day, a 15% reduction in  
   machines used,  
 1927 Nov. 20 mo. No work for 4 days & nights per mo.,a 23%  
   reduction in machines used, and a reduction of  
   4 hrs/day 
11. 1930 Feb.   5 mo. No work for 2 days & nights per mo.,and a  
   10% reduction in machines used 
 1930 June   5 mo. No work for 2 days & nights per mo., and a  
   20% reduction in machines used 
 1930 Nov.   2 mo. Same 
 
Sources: Otokichi Shoji, Boseki sogyo tanshuku shi [A History of the Spinning 
Operation Reductions] (Osaka: Nippon mengyo kurabu, 1930); Seisan chosa 
kai (ed.), Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries] (Tokyo: Seisan 
chosa kai, 1912); Shotaro Kojima, Waga kuni shuyo sangyo ni okeru karuteru 
 teki tosei [Cartel-Controls in the Major Industries in Our Country] 407-18 
(Tokyo: Yufukan shobo, 1932). 
 
 
 
Table 3: Quantity Restraints and Spindle Productivity 
 
Mandated Bales/  Mandated Bales/ 
Reductions  Spindle  Reductions Spindle 
1899  0% 578 1916  1.9% 684 
1900  9.9 475 1917  0 654 
1901  3.8 499 1918  0 578 
1902  7.2 570 1919  0 576 
1903  0 581 1920 31.5 492 
 
1904  0 515 1921 47.0 454  
1905 0 657 1922 0 508 
1906  0 699 1923  0 465 
1907  0 663 1924  0 453 
1908 16.8 545 1925  0 485 
 
1909 20.0 556 1926  0 490 
1910 12.4 566 1927 28.9 453 
1911 19.7 521 1928 47.2 401 
1912    9.7 626 1929 23.6 440 
1913   0 664 1930 21.8 374 
 
1914  7.6 646 1931 25.3 358 
1915  27.9 620 
 
Mean bales/spindle, when restrictions in place: 506. 
Mean bales/spindle, when no restrictions in place: 559. 
Mean mandated reduction when restrictions in place: 21.2%. 
Mean actual reduction: 9.5%. 
 
Notes: Mandated reductions are calculated on the basis of 20 hour work 
days (2 shifts), 28 work-day months, 7 hour nights. 1916 is treated as an 
unrestricted year. Bales/spindle gives the number of cotton bales 
produced, divided by the number of spindles in place. 
 
 Table 3 cont.: 
Sources: Calculated from data found in Table 2; Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo 
ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton Industry] 446 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku 
shuppan kai, 1954). 
 
 
B. Leaks: 
Nevertheless, as a long-term monopoly-pricing strategy this cartel 
never had a chance. First, the Japanese cotton spinning firms faced 
constant pressure from potential entrants. This simply was not an industry 
with large entry barriers. The most spectacularly successful late entrant 
was Nisshin boseki. Cotton merchant Hirazaemon Hibiya had launched 
the firm in 1907. By 1910 it was in the second quintile of firms; by 1930 it 
ranked sixth in a field of over sixty.18 Smaller firms, however, continued to 
enter the industry throughout the pre-war period. 
Second, the cartel never (a) incorporated all members (much less all 
potential members) of the industry, or (b) limited investments in new 
productive capacity.19 Consider each of these issues in turn. 
1. Incomplete membership. The Boren never included all members of the 
industry. Most obviously, it excluded foreign competitors, this at a time 
when producers often joined cartels across national boundaries.20 The 
Boren began as an organization of Japanese spinning firms, and forever 
remained that. Nonetheless, those firms sold in what was always a global 
market. Despite variations in thread quality, many firms in many 
countries produced interchangeable thread. Granted, foreign spinners 
could not necessarily compete in the domestic Japanese market. Tariffs on 
imported cotton products helped ensure that. Notwithstanding, Japanese 
firms did compete abroad with spinners from several countries—most 
prominently, Great Britain, U.S., France, Germany, and India.  
18 Nisshin boseki K.K. (ed.), Nisshin boseki 60 nen shi [A Sixty-Year History of Nisshin 
boseki] (Tokyo: Nisshin boseki, K.K., 1969); Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai (ed.), Dai-Nippon 
boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly Newsletter] (Osaka: Dai-
Nippon boseki rengo kai, various issues) (relative size of firms by number of spindles). 
19 In addition, note that the cartel did not take several obvious steps open to it. The 
firms could have tried to restrict output through their coordinated import scheme 
involving the N.Y.K. (described below), but did not. Indeed, they could have set prices, 
but did not. 
20  Terushi Hara & Akira Kudo, International Cartels in Business History, in Akira Kudo 
& Terushi Hara (eds.) International Cartels in Business History 1, 2 (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1992). 
 The spinners sold much of their product in this competitive 
international market. Even when they sold to domestic weavers, those 
weavers often exported the finished fabric.21 Given these international 
fabric markets, Japanese spinners generally could not have charged 
monopoly yarn prices to domestic weavers: as long as a downstream 
product faces a competitive market, upstream cartels with fewer than all 
producers (e.g., a spinning cartel that excludes foreign competitors) will 
seldom be able to raise prices. Indeed, because many of the largest 
Japanese spinners (like the large American spinners) ran integrated 
spinning and weaving operations, many Boren members sold fabric on the 
international market directly (Table 4).22 
Until 1936, the Boren could not even convince all Japanese spinners to 
join.23 To be sure, it tried to make membership worthwhile. It never made 
it indispensable. In 1893 it negotiated a favorable shipping contract with 
the N.Y.K., the Mitsubishi shipping firm.24 Under this agreement, the 
N.Y.K. agreed to pay large rebates to association members who used it for 
their raw cotton. More specifically, the N.Y.K. charged shippers full price, 
but at the end of the accounting season rebated to Boren members a large 
portion of that price.  
Unfortunately for the Boren, the bulk shipping market was a 
competitive market. As one scholar recently put it, “collusion among 
shippers has never survived” in this industry.25 The Japanese shipping 
firms launched periodic price wars with the western firms, and were not 
always the low bidder. Yet the Boren could have made membership 
21  Mihashi, supra note 7, at 7 (foreign competitors); 0kura sho zeikanbu (ed.), 
Kanzeiritsu enkaku [A History of Tariff Rates] Tokyo: 0kura sho, 1968) (tariffs). 
22 Although these integrated firms operated fewer than 20 percent of all looms, they 
operated the most efficient ones. In 1936, they ran nearly three-fourths of the 46,000 
automatic looms in use. With a fifth of the looms, they wove a third of the fabric. See 
Table 4; Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka (ed.), Kojo tokei hyo [Census of Manufactures] 413 
(Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai, 1936) (automatic loom use). On integrated spinning and 
weaving operations in the West, see John S. Lyons, Vertical Integration in the British Cotton 
Industry, 1825-1850: A Revision, 45 J. Econ. Hist. 419 (1985); Peter Temin, Product Quality 
and Vertical Integration in the Early Cotton Textile Industry, 48 J. Econ. Hist. 891 (1988). 
23 As of September 1927, for instance, 11 spinning companies representing 6 percent 
of all cotton spindles were outside the Boren. Nippon kangyo, supra note 7, at 55-58. The 
remaining 11 firms joined the Boren in May 1936. Zaisei keizai jiho sha (ed.), Nippon sen’i 
kogyo soran okutsuki [An Overview of the Japanese Textile Industry, with Appendix] 210 
(Tokyo: Zaisei keizai jiho sha, 1936). 
24 Reprinted in Seisan chosa kai (ed.), Shuyo kogyo gairan [Survey of Major Industries] 
26-29 (Tokyo: Seisan chosa kai, 1912). Other shipping firms later joined the N.Y.K. 
25 Pirrong, supra note 1, at 128. 
 advantageous only (i) if the N.Y.K. charged prices below international 
competitive prices, and (ii) if no other international shipping firm were 
willing to match those prices.26  
Renegade spinners simply did not need the N.Y.K. Although the Boren 
firms could together obtain bulk discounts, so could most other spinners. 
Major spinning firms would have qualified for equivalent discounts 
elsewhere. Whatever clout the Boren had, as the shipping arm of the 
Mitsubishi empire the N.Y.K. was not the sort of firm on which it likely 
could have imposed monopsonistic prices. Unless it was indeed extracting 
monopsonistic rents, though, renegade firms could have competed 
without joining it.27  
2. Investment limits. As Table 3 details, the Boren never tried to limit the 
total number of spindles. Instead, it mandated cuts only in either operating 
hours or the percentage of spindles used. This made for a bizarre cartel, 
for to earn its members monopoly rents the Boren had to cut the quantity 
produced. To do that, it could not just cut hours or furlough existing 
spindles. It needed also to limit the purchase of new spindles. That it 
26 Shotaro Kojima, Waga kuni shuyo sangyo ni okeru karuteru teki tosei [Cartel-Controls in 
the Major Industries in Our Country] 478-511 (Tokyo: Yufukan shobo, 1932) (shipping 
cartels); Nihon keiei shi kenkyu sho (ed.), Nippon yusen kabushiki kaisha 100-nen shi [A 100-
Year History of the N.Y.K.] 7-74, 123-29 (Tokyo: Nippon yusen kabushiki kaisha, 1988) 
(competition between N.Y.K. and the western firms); William D. Wray, Mitsubishi and the 
N.Y.K., 1870-1914: Busines Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry 289-308, 400-08 
(Cambridge: Harv. Council E. Asian Stud. Pub., 1984) (same); William D. Wray, Kagami 
Kenkichi and the N.Y.K., 1929-1935: Vertical Control, Horizontal Strategy, and Company 
Autonomy, in William D. Wray (ed.), Managing Industrial Enterprise: Cases from the Prewar 
Experience 182, 187 (Cambridge: Harv. Council E. Asian Stud. Pub.) (existence of irregular 
“tramp shipping”).  
Indeed, if the Boren had been a pricefixing scheme and if the N.Y.K. had had a lock 
on cotton imports, one would expect the Boren to have enforced its quantity restraints 
through its control over raw cotton imports. Given that the spinners depended critically 
on cotton imports, that bottleneck offered the perfect monitoring device. The Boren did 
not do so—both because it was not a pricefixing scheme (discussed infra), and because the 
N.Y.K. did not have a lock on the import trade. 
27 In addition, note two points. First, the Boren convinced the domestic raw cotton 
producers not to sell to non-Boren firms. Because domstic producers raised a small 
fraction of the cotton consumed, this was not a major barrier. Second, in 1930 the Boren 
convinced the cotton yarn sellers’ association not to buy yarn from non-Boren firms. In 
return, Boren members agreed to sell only to members of the sellers’ association. See 
Kojima, supra note 26, at 413; Nippon kangyo, supra note 7, at 54-55; Seki, supra note 3, at 
114-16. At this point, the only firms safely able to remain outside the Boren would have 
been those that both spun and wove. As Table 4 shows, however, the biggest Japanese 
firms operated integrated spinning and weaving factories.  
 never did. In letting firms buy new spindles but not letting them use them 
fully, it apparently ensured only that its members invested inefficiently. 
Even as the Boren mandated production cuts, spinning firms 
continued to buy new equipment (Table 5). Despite the capacity restraints, 
they aggressively built new factories and installed new spindles. Indeed, 
they built more factories and installed more spindles while the restraints 
were in place than while they were not. Were this a production-restriction 
cartel, it was one that failed.  
 
 
Table 4: Spinning Firms in the Weaving Industry 
 
 A B  D E G 
 Total Spinning C= Total Spinning F= E/Firm 
 Looms Looms B/A Fabric  Fabric  E/D Rev. 
1905    6,077  %    715 154 21.5%  11.9% 
1910  17,002   1222 332 27.2 18.5 
1915  27,931   1824  710 38.9 27.3 
1920  43,725   6936 2950 42.5 27.0 
1925 365,369 61,918 16.9 7719 2732 35.4 22.5 
1930 348,903 69,147 19.8 4933 1631 33.1 25.5 
1935 385,980 83,308 21.6 8104 2466 30.4 21.7 
 
Notes:  
(A) Total number of cotton weaving looms in use.  
(B) Total number of cotton weaving looms used by spinning firms.  
(C) Percentage of cotton weaving looms used by spinning firms. 
(D) Value in current prices (x ¥100,000) of total cotton fabric produced.  
(E) Value in current prices (x ¥100,000) of cotton fabric produced by 
spinning firms.  
(F) Percentage of total cotton fabric produced by spinning firms. 
(G) Percentage of spinning firm revenues attributable to weaving 
operations. 
 
Sources: Calculated from data found in Shozaburo Fujino, Shino Fujino & 
Akira Ono, Choki keizai tokei: Sen’i kogyo [Long-Term Economic Statistics: 
Textile Industry] 74-83, 242-43 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979); 
Miyohei Shinohara, Choki keizai tokei: kokogyo [Long-term Economic Statistics: 
Mining and Manufacturing] 194-95 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1972); 
Shoko daijin kanbo tokei ka (ed.), Shoko sho tokei hyo [Statistical Tables for 
 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry] (Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai, various 
years). 
 
Table 5: Spinning Cartel Cheating 
 
 A.  B.  C. 
 Mandated Spinning Spindles 
 Reductions  Factories (x 1000_) 
1920 31.5%   (40) 355 
1921 47.0      89 299 
1922   0 (159) 394 
1923    0      (1) 284 
 
1924    0  20 (91) 
1925    0  (8) 451 
1926    0  37 293 
1927 28.9 (22) 263 
 
1928 47.2   6 531 
1929 23.6 38 233 
1930 21.8  18 595 
1931 25.3  15 221 
 
Mean new spindles while restrictions in place: 328,000. 
Mean new spindles while no restrictions in place: 266,000. 
Mean new spinning fact’s while restrictions in place: 14.8. 
Mean new spinning fact’s while no restrictions in place: -22.2. 
 
Notes:  
(A) Cartel-mandated reductions.  
(B) Net increase (or decrease) in number of spinning factories with five or 
more employees.  
(C) Net increase (or decrease) in number of operating spindles.  
 
Sources: Calculated from data found in Table 2; Shoko daijin kanbo tokei 
ka (ed.), Kojo tokei hyo [Census of Manufactures] (Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai, 
various years); Tsusho sangyo daijin kanbo chosa tokei kyoku (ed.), Kogyo 
tokei 50 nenshi [A Fifty Year History of the Manufactures Census] (Tokyo: 
0kura sho insatsu kyoku, 1961); Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of 
 the Japanese Cotton Industry] 446 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 
1954). 
 
 
C. Temporary Local Gains? 
Even if the Boren firms could not have earned monopoly rents long-
term, perhaps they hoped to exploit a temporary local monopoly.28 
Expansion in the industry did take time. Because most firms already 
operated 25 to 28 days a month, 20 to 22 hours a day, non-Boren firms 
could not have dramatically expanded production without buying new 
machines. Yet until the 1920s, almost all machines came from either Great 
Britain or the United States. Even with a telegraphed order, expansion 
would have taken quite a while. Meanwhile, perhaps the Boren firms 
could have earned monopoly returns.29 
28 Many Japanese historians (e.g., Nishikawa, supra note 10, at 154; 2 Naosuke 
Takamura, Nihon boseki gyo shi josetsu [An Introduction to the History of the Japanese Spinning 
Industry] 178-91 (Tokyo: Hanawa shobo, 1971)) suggest a very different explanation for 
the cartel: that the largest spinning firms used the restrictions to gain a competitive 
advantage over the smaller firms. Recall, however, that membership in the cartel was 
voluntary, that spinning firms imported raw cotton in a competitive international market, 
and that they sold yarn and fabric on a competitive international market. As a result, this 
explanation necessarily fails. The large spinning firms could have induced the small 
firms to join the Boren (or to remain in the Boren) and suffer the exploitative 
consequences only if the small firms earned a net gain by doing so. Hence the large firms 
would have had to compensate the smaller firms for any exploitation the small firms 
summered. Because of the competitive market constraints, however, the large Boren 
firms had no way of using the Boren to generate sufficient monopoly rents to pay that 
compensation and still earn a profit. 
Tetsuji Okazaki, 1930-nen dai no Nihon ni okeru keiki junkan [Japanese Business Cycles 
and Capital Accumulation in the 1930s], 39-2 Shakai kagaku kenkyu 1 (1987), suggests a 
ingenious alternative: Small spinners were heavily invested in low-count thread, and 
large spinners were invested in high-count thread. Small spinners wanted to move into 
high-count thread and used the cartel to give them breathing space to do that. Aside from 
whether the cartel would have given any breathing space without international market 
power, and aside from whether large firms would ever have agreed to such a plan, 
Okazaki’s theory does not explain why small firms would find advantageous a scheme 
that disabled themselves as much as it disabled their competitors. 
29 On the hours and days worked, see the tables at the end of any issue of Dai-
Nippon, supra note 18; on the source of spinning machines, see Mariko Tatsuki, Mitsui 
Bussan no setsuritsu to hatten [The Establishment and Development of Mitsui Bussan], in 
Nakagawa, et al., supra note 12, at 36, 40. 
 As an explanation for the Boren, none of this could have worked—
short-term monopoly returns cannot explain the measures the Boren took. 
Most basically, the measures were not short-term. Rather, they lasted for 
months and years. Nor did the Boren ignore the measures once 
competition eroded any monopoly price. Instead, month after month, 
Boren firms regrouped to change the percentage of spindles furloughed, 
the number of days closed, or the number of hours per day worked. To 
the firms themselves, the cuts meant more than any short-term advantage. 
Second, (as noted earlier) the Boren firms never tried to limit total 
production. Absent such an agreement, they could not have raised prices. 
As Tables 2 and 3 show, although they required each other to reduce the 
percentage of their equipment that they operated, they let each other 
freely expand that equipment. Had they wanted to affect prices, they 
would not have agreed just to cut the stock used. They would also have 
agreed to idle any new equipment they bought. Because they did not do 
so, the Boren firms could not have successfully raised prices, even 
temporarily. According to Gary Saxonhouse, the American economist 
who has spent the most time on the industry, they did not: Boren firms 
did not “restrict industry output, even on a cyclical basis.”30 
IV. Cotton Logic 
The basic puzzle thus remains: if the Boren firms were not trying to 
earn monopoly rents, what did they think they were doing? The answer, I 
suggest, is that they were trying to solve two principal-agent problems at 
once: to pay workers enough to reduce their “shirking,” and to enable 
their managers to commit credibly to keeping wages at levels that would 
mitigate that shirking.31 Turn first to the wages in the industry (Section 
IV.A.), then to the managerial problems (Section IV.B.). 
30 Gary Saxonhouse, Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the 
Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry, in Hugh Patrick and Larry Meisner (eds.), Japanese 
Industrialization and its Social Consequences 97, 122 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1976); Gary Saxonhouse, Mechanisms for Technology Transfer in Japanese Economic 
History, 12 Managerial & Dec. Econ. ___ (1991). Note that this is consistent with the 9.5% 
fall in productivity during the cartel (Table 3). The cartels were in place during slack 
demand. Even if they had been completely ineffective, production would have fallen 
somewhat during their tenure—if only because consumers were less willing to buy the 
yarn. 
31 Readers may also ask why the Boren (like many trade associations) did not try to 
manipulate the political process to form a legally enforceable cartel. The reason, 
elaborated on in Rosenbluth & Ramseyer, supra note 2, is that the zaibatsu firms had the 
greatest political influence in pre-war Japan, and the zaibatsu firms had interests contrary 
 A. Efficiency Wages:  
1. Monitoring and shirking. Picture the problem that the owners of the 
new mills faced. In a society where almost all manufacturing occurred in 
small shops, they built massive factories. In a world where machines ran 
on muscle or water, they introduced steam and later electricity. In the new 
factories, they installed large, complicated, and expensive British-made 
machines. 
To run these powerful new factories and machines, the owners needed 
managers and workers they did not have. They needed managers who 
could organize individual workers into teams suited to factory 
production. They needed managers who could structure incentives so that 
the workers individually would not free-ride on each other. They needed 
managers who could teach people to run the new machines and to avoid 
breaking them. As of 1891, however, they had only one formally trained 
engineer for every six factories.32  
The owners also needed workers who would work obediently, 
regularly, and carefully. As the new ring spindles were relatively easy to 
operate, they did not need workers who understood much physics or 
chemistry, or workers with much physical strength. They did need 
workers who would not ignore instructions, who would not skip work on 
a whim, and who would not take breaks that disrupted production at the 
entire plant. They needed, in short, workers with what we now call “basic 
work habits.” Before the industrial revolution, few people considered such 
habits basic, for few people needed them in either agrarian or handicraft 
production. Eventually, school teachers did bring these habits to Japanese 
peasant children. As of 1891, though, only a quarter of the workers at the 
spinning plants had attended primary school.33  
Somehow, the mill owners had to teach their workers to use the new 
machines safely and effectively, to convince them to work together as a 
team, and to induce them not to free-ride on each other. Fundamentally, 
to the Boren. The zaibatsu were not heavily invested in cotton spinning (Table 10). Yet the 
Mitsubishi (through the N.Y.K.) shipped the bulk of the raw cotton to the spinners, while 
the Mitsui marketed the finished product abroad. Any contraction in the raw cotton 
consumed or the cotton yarn sold (even if international competitive market forces would 
have allowed this) would thus have directly harmed the politically powerful Mitsubishi 
and Mitsui. 
32 Saxonhouse, Country, supra note 30, at 109; see Noshomu sho somukyoku tokeika 
(ed.) Noshomu tokei hyo [Agricultural and Commercial Statistics] 63 (Tokyo: Noshomu sho 
somukyoku tokeika, 1903) (many factory supervisors did not understand the machines 
under their jurisdiction). 
33  Saxonhouse, Country, supra note 30, at 109. 
 this was largely a matter of incentives. Unfortunately, to use the optimal 
incentives the owners had to be able to monitor workers individually and 
to dispense appropriate penalties and rewards. Yet precisely because it 
involves joint production, team work is hard to meter. Precisely because 
cotton spinning involved team work, the owners found it hard to meter 
their workers—and hard, therefore, to reward and discipline them 
appropriately.  
This is complicated enough where the technology is familiar; it is 
harder still where everything about the factory is strange.34 With new 
machines, an owner often will have no idea how much he (the owners and 
managers of these factories were generally men) can expect of a recruit. 
Not knowing what to expect, he cannot set the proper piece rate. 
Predictably, many of the earliest Japanese factory owners produced 
nothing so much as chaos. Their workers did not know how to use the 
machines, their managers did not know how to structure incentives to 
motivate workers, and absent appropriate incentives the workers had 
little reason to learn to use the machines.  
Contemporary observers chronicled the chaos. “If a supervisor can see 
the employees (particularly day laborers), they work attentively,” 
reported one otherwise sympathetic man in 1899. “But as soon as he 
disappears, they gossip in groups of two or three.”35 “The day after 
payday,” another observer wrote, “employees regularly skip work.”36 
According to the oral histories of the workers themselves, they even slept 
on the job.37  
2. Market-clearing wages. Workers shirked in these early factories for a 
simple reason: they preferred leisure to work and had no reason not to 
indulge that preference. Through their work, they earned the going rate—
a wage that cleared the labor market. But when labor markets clear, 
34 Given (a) the asymmetric distribution of information between workers and 
management regarding worker abilities, and (b) the inability of management to commit 
credibly to a given wage structure, piece rate contracts never entirely solve the incentive 
problem. See Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy ch. 5 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 
Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982). 
35 Gennosuke Yokoyama, Nihon no kaso shakai [Japanese Lower-Class Society] 179 
(Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1899) (cotton spinning workers). 
36 Noshomu sho, Shokko jijo [Circumstances of Factory Workers] 235 (1903; reprinted, 
Tokyo: Koseikan, 1981) (steel workers). 
37 Shigemi Yamamoto, Aa nomugi toge: aru seishi kojo aishi [Ah, the Nomugi Pass: A 
Tragic History of the Factory Women in the Silk Thread Industry] 180 (Tokyo: Kadogawa 
shoten, 1977). 
 workers who quit a job can easily find another. And if all firms pay the 
market-clearing wage, a worker will earn the same wage in her (most 
textile workers were women) new job as she earned in the old. Workers 
can safely work when they want, rest when they want. In agricultural and 
handicraft industries, such work habits seldom disrupt. In a modern 
factory, they wreak havoc. 
If the spinning mills could have monitored their workers cheaply, they 
could have mitigated this problem. If their managers might have noticed 
and fired them when they shirked, workers would have shirked less 
profligately. Yet monitoring is not free, of course, and hence the problem. 
The more monitoring costs, the more cheaply workers can indulge their 
preference for leisure over work. If losing their job costs them little (if they 
earn market-clearing wages) and if monitoring is often ineffective (if they 
can often shirk unnoticed), rational workers may choose to shirk as they 
please. 
3. Efficiency wages. All this generates the well-known paradox of 
“efficiency wages”: the more monitoring costs, the more likely employers 
can lower labor costs by raising wages.38 If workers shirk because they can 
easily earn equivalent wages elsewhere, a firm can sometimes save money 
by paying them more. For when it does so, workers who lose their job lose 
income. Rather than lose their well-paying job (a risk they retain if the 
firm maintains even moderate levels of monitoring), they may now decide 
to reduce their shirking. Even if all equivalent firms pay the same high 
wages, workers who lose their job still lose—for wages above market-
clearing levels necessarily generate unemployment. Given the higher 
unemployment levels, fired workers now spend longer finding their next 
job.  
The classic example is Ford. In 1914, Henry Ford paid his workers 
$2.34 per day. The wage was the going rate and cleared the market. 
Because everyone else paid it as well, jobs were easy to find. Workers, 
observers recalled, could quit Ford in the morning and find another job by 
noon. As a result, Ford found himself with an annual turnover rate of 370 
percent, and chaos in his assembly line. To solve this problem, he doubled 
wages. At $5 a day, workers now stood in line for a Ford job. At $5 a day, 
38 See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information 166-67 (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989); 
Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device 
74 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1984); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the 
Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1987); see also Eric Rasmusen, “An Income-
Satiation Model of Efficiency Wages,” 80 Econ. Inquiry 467, 475 (1992) (model applicable 
to low-wage workers). 
 Ford himself boasted, “I have a thousand men who if I say ‘Be at the 
northeast corner of the building at four a.m.,’ will be there at four a.m.”39  
The large Lancashire cotton spinning mills in the 19th century similarly 
paid efficiency wages.40 Because they regularly experimented with new 
technology, they regularly found it hard to monitor their employees. “In 
the heyday of industrialization, managerial methods of supervising 
workers and monitoring how much they could produce were 
unsophisticated,” explains economic historian Michael Huberman. Even 
though the larger Lancashire firms tried to mitigate these problems with 
piece-rate wages, they still “had difficulty in linking effort to output and 
setting piece rates.” Accordingly, they chose not to rely exclusively on 
monitoring. Instead, they “paid efficiency wages to reduce the loss of 
productivity associated with shirking.”41  
4. The Japanese mills. Turn-of-the-century Japanese cotton-spinning 
firms too paid efficiency wages. The giant Kanebo firm did so most 
extravagantly, advertising not just its wages but also the various other 
amenities it offered. Modern scholars often doubt whether it improved 
employee welfare as much as it claimed, but in doubting they miss the 
point. Kanebo did not adopt its scheme out of charity. Instead, it adopted 
it as a simple profit-maximizing efficiency wage strategy. Its wage 
premium was stark. Table 6 details (i) the mean daily wage paid by all 
Boren firms to their female workers as of the middle of each year, (ii) the 
comparable figure for Kanebo, and (iii) the resulting premium attributable 
to Kanebo employment. In the late 19th century, Kanebo paid close to a 
third more than its competitors. Although Kanebo’s wage dominance 
faded, it faded only because other firms soon hiked their wages as well. As 
Table 7 shows, the larger firms did adopt efficiency wages before the 
smaller firms did; but as Table 8 shows, by 1910 the industry as a whole 
paid textile workers double what they could earn on the farm. 
The Japanese story does not parallel early-19th century Lancashire 
completely. Where only the larger Lancashire firms paid high wages, by 
39  Miller, supra note 34, 65-71. 
40 Michael Huberman, Invisible Handshakes in Lancashire: Cotton Spinning in the First 
Half of the Nineteenth Century, 46 J. Econ. Hist. 987 (1986); Michael Huberman, How Did 
Labor Markets Work in Lancashire? More Evidence on Prices and Quantities in Cotton Spinning, 
1822-1852, 28 Explorations Econ. Hist. 87 (1991); Michael Huberman, Industrial Relations 
and the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from M’Connel and Kennedy, 1810-1840, 65 Bus. Hist. 
Rev. 345 (1991). 
41 Huberman, How, supra note 40, at 88. 
 1915 large and small Japanese firms alike paid similar rates (Table 7).42 
Because large and small firms used the same technology in Japan, similar 
wages and hours are exactly what one would expect. By the turn of the 
century, almost all Japanese mills used standard steam-powered Platt 
Brothers machines.43 Whatever monitoring problems large firms 
experienced, small firms faced them too. After large firms found it 
advantageous to pay high wages, small firms soon followed suit. 
 
 
Table 6: The Kanebo Wage Premium 
 
 Boren Kanebo  Kanebo 
 mean mean premium 
1898 ¥14.99 ¥19.60 30.8% 
1908    24.89    29.00 16.5 
1919    80.51    84.10    4.5 
 
Source: Calculated from data found in Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai 
(ed.), Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation 
Monthly Newsletter] (Osaka: Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years) 
(1918 data unavailable). 
 
 
Table 7: Mean Hours and Wages in  
the Spinning Industry, by Firm Size 
 
A. Daily Hours 
 
Quintile  1900 1905 1910 1915 1921 1925 
First 19.4 22.7 22.9 22.3 19.8 19.7 
Second 19.0 21.7 22.3 21.9 19.0 21.1 
Third  18.8 23.3 20.6 23.0 20.1 19.6 
Fourth 16.9 22.8 22.6 23.1 20.1 19.9 
Fifth 18.1 22.4 21.4 22.8 19.5 20.2 
42 A point confirmed by separate calculations in Konosuke Odaka, Niju kozo [Dual 
Structure] in Takafusa Nakamura and Konosuke Odaka (eds.), Niju kozo [Dual Structure] 
133, 161 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989). 
43 Tatsuki, supra note 29, at 37; Saxonhouse, Mechanisms, supra note 30. 
 Table 7 cont.: 
B. Daily Wages 
 
Quintile  1900 1905 1910 1915 1921 1925_ 
First ¥0.193 ¥0.239 ¥0.298 ¥0.319 ¥1.109  ¥1.323 
Second  0.195 0.224   0.268  0.302  1.073  1.096 
Third  0.175 0.217  0.284  0.310  1.201  1.222 
Fourth  0.164  0.190  0.246  0.344 1.079 1.225 
Fifth  0.153  0.192  0.236  0.305 1.060 1.260 
 
Mandated cuts: 9.9%  0.0  12.4  27.9 31.5  0.0 
 
Notes: The firms are divided into quintiles on the basis of the number of 
spindles in each firm. Wages are daily wages for female workers in 
current yen. The data are for the months of July for each year except when 
July was unavailable (when nearest available month was used instead). 
Mandated production cuts are taken from Table 3. Hours are number of 
hours of operation of factories operated by firm. 1921 is substituted for 
1920 because of the unavailability of 1920 data. 
 
Sources: Calculated from data found in Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai (ed.), 
Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai geppo [Great Japan Spinning Federation Monthly 
Newsletter] (Osaka: Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years). 
 
 
5. The quantity of labor. Given their efficiency wage strategy, Japanese 
spinners could not resond to demand shocks by cutting wages. Instead, 
they had to cut the quantity of labor they hired. Recall that they paid a 
premium in order to induce employees not to shirk. If they now cut that 
premium, they increased shirking. In the long run, they thereby raised 
their total labor costs. 
Because most textile workers came from (and returned to) rural 
villages, the shadow wage that determined whether they found shirking 
advantageous depended on the difference between their spinning wage 
and their agricultural wage. During much of the pre-war period, about 80 
percent of the cotton-spinning workers were women, and about 60 percent 
of these women came from the farm.44 In terms of efficiency wage, the 
44 Chuo shokugyo shokai jimukyoku (ed.), Boseki rodo fujin chosa [An Investigation into 
Women Working in the Spinning Industry] 5 (Tokyo: Chuo shokugyo shokai jimukyoku, 
 crucial premium for them was the premium they received over the 
agricultural wage. If the demand for cotton yarn fell, spinning firms paying 
efficiency wages could safely cut wages only if agricultural wages also fell. 
In fact, they often did not. Hence, if a spinning firm sought to pay double 
or triple the agricultural wage, it could not respond to demand shocks by 
lowering wages. It could only lower production.45 Japanese firms did just 
that—when demand fell, they cut the quantity of labor they hired (Table 
8).  
Note a complication: if spinning firms cut output by firing workers, 
they potentially vitiated their efficiency wage scheme, for workers would 
discount their higher wages by their higher probability of being fired. 
Rather than lay off existing workers, therefore, Japanese spinning firms 
cut production by delaying new hires. In most years, 1/4 to 1/3 of their 
workers quit voluntarily anyway. They quit because they had never 
planned to work a long time. They had come to the factory to work a few 
years and save. Having done exactly as they planned, they returned to 
their farm to marry. Because so many women quit each year, the spinning 
firms could adjust to demand shocks simply by deferring new hires.46 
6. The price of labor. Few facts about the spinning firms are more 
prominent than the high wages they paid their workers (Table 8). Most of 
these workers were young women off the farm with few marketable 
abilities other than agricultural skills. By 1910, the cotton spinning firms 
paid them double the agricultural wage. They continued to pay at least 
double for most of the next three decades.47 
1929); Takejiro Shindo, Mengyo rodo sanko tokei [Reference Statistics Regarding Labor in the 
Cotton Industry] 365 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1958). 
45 That cutting production would generally lower per-unit production costs is 
straightforward: on a short-term basis, cutting production quantity lowers marginal (and 
short-term average variable) production costs because the marginal cost curve cuts 
average cost curves from below, and because the short-term average variable cost curve 
lies below the average total cost curve. In a long-term equilibrium, of course, firms will 
sell at a price equal to long-term total average costs. 
46 Hosei daigaku keizai gaku bu (ed.), Keihin kogyo chitai o chushin to suru chingin chosa 
hokoku [Survey Report on Wages Paid Primarily in the Keihin Industrial Area] 187-91 (Tokyo: 
Hosei daigaku keizai gaku bu, 1936); Riyuemon Uno, Shokko kinzoku nen su cho (jo) [A 
Survey of Work Tenure Among Factory Workers (I)] 14 (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1915) 
(Shokko mondai shiryo, No. A163); Riyuemon Uno, Shokko kinzoku nen su cho (ge) [A 
Survey of Work Tenure Among Factory Workers (II)] 12 (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1915) 
(Shokko mondai shiryo, No. A164). 
47 Shindo, supra note 44, at 396, finds similar ratios for the early post-War years. I use 
mean annual wage rates for female agricultural workers rather than mean daily wage rates 
(as, e.g., 1 Takamura, supra note 28, at 302, does) for two reasons. First, agricultural work 
 Other data indirectly confirm these high wages. Take one 1927 survey 
of 3,966 workers at 12 cotton spinning factories. These women sent home 
each month mean amounts ranging from 5.2 percent of their wages at one 
factory to 60.5 percent at another. Unfortunately, the report does not give 
the number of respondents within each plant. Averaging the 12 factory 
means, however, gives a mean of 36.0 percent. In addition, these women 
every month saved another 7.0 to 52.1 percent of their pay. Averaging the 
factory means gives 24.3 percent. All told, the women saved or sent home 
an average of 59.9 percent of their wages: amounts ranging from a mean 
of 43.2 percent at the lowest factory to 67.5 percent at the highest.48 
7. Historians and textile workers. Despite this evidence, sophisticated 
social historians continue vociferously to lament the plight of the spinning 
mill workers. Gail Lee Bernstein, for example, describes the lives that the 
silk-reeling workers (a job with some technical differences from cotton 
spinning) lived as “deplorable.” Workers sang, she adds, songs with titles 
like the “Song of the Living Corpses.”49 Patricia Tsurumi describes the 
spinning mill dormitories as “prisons,” the wash rooms as “appalling,” 
was highly seasonal where textile work was steadier. Thus, daily textile and agricultural 
rates do not give an accurate picture of the relative expected earnings of women in the 
two sectors. Second, spinning firms generally provided room (or at least provided 
heavily subsidized room) in addition to wages; yearly agricultural contracts probably did 
as well, though daily work did not. Note that most spinning firms did charge for board. 
According to one 1927 survey of 12 cotton spinning factories, the women paid the factory 
a mean food charge ranging from 10.8 percent of salary at one factory to 22.8 percent at 
another. The mean of the 12 factory means was 16.9 percent. Chuo, supra note 44, at 69-
70; see Hosei, supra note 46, at 168. According to Riyuemon Uno, Shoku hi teigaku no chosa 
[A Survey of Food Charges] (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1917) (Shokko mondai shiryo, No. 
B79), factories charged an average of 9.31 sen/day for board, and subsidized these meals 
with another 4.57 sen/day. 
48 Chuo, supra note 44, at 69-70; Hosoi, supra note 46, at 140, 184 (corroborating data). 
Firms sometimes offered the woman (or her family) a sign-on loan of part of her future 
earnings. Unlike the cash advances in the sex industry (see J. Mark Ramseyer, Indentured 
Prostitution in Imperial Japan: Credible Commitments in the Commercial Sex Industry, 7 J. Law, 
Econ. & Org. 89 (1991)) these loans were relatively small. Of a sample of 8,926 workers 
hired by large Tokyo-area spinning factories in 1926, workers (or their families) received 
a mean sign-on loan of only ¥22.23—about 16 days’ wages. See Chuo, supra note 44, at 33; 
corroborarted by data in Hosoi, supra note 46, at 99, 140. 
49 Gail Lee Bernstein, Women in the Silk-reeling Industry in Nineteenth-century Japan, in 
Gail Lee Bernstein & Haruhiro Fukui (eds.), Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History 
and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi 63 (London: Macmillan Press, 1988). She rightly 
notes that the women “may have been better off” than they had been at home. Id., at 67. 
An English translation of the song appears at E. Patricia Tsurumi, Factory Girls: Women in 
the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan 157-59 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
 and the food as “shoddy” and inadequate. Winter days in the factories 
were cold, and “the hot humid days of summer were hell.”50 Andrew 
Gordon assigns textile workers “the worst objective situation of any group 
of workers.”51 And Mikiso Hane concludes that “what frequently came to 
prevail was unrestrained exploitation.”52  
Perhaps the historians rely too heavily on the the documents bourgeois 
journalists and social reformers left, for the women themselves told a 
radically different story.53 Consider oral historian Shigemi Yamamoto’s 
experience. Yamamoto interviewed 580 former textile workers for what he 
planned as their “tragic history.” To his surprise, none of the women 
regretted having taken her factory job, none complained of the food she 
ate in the factory dormitories, none thought she had been underpaid, and 
only three percent of the women thought their work had been harsh. By 
contrast, 90 percent thought the food had been good, 70 percent thought 
their pay had been high, and most found the work “more fun than the 
work at home.”54 
“At least I got to eat rice,” one former textile worker told Yamamoto. 
“It was better than staying home.” And whether many sang Bernstein’s 
“Song of the Living Corpses,” Yamamoto’s interviewees remembered 
some very different songs:55 
Shall I fall in love with the boss,  
or shall I ignore the boss?  
Think about it,  
and before you know it you’ve finished the thread. 
Rather than fall for the boss and be hated,  
50Tsurumi, supra note 49, at 132-35, 141. Elsewhere, she properly notes that the wages 
were higher than other employment opportunities for women, and that the “poorly 
prepared and spoiled food” that the women supposedly received “would have seemed a 
splendid feast” to starving peasants. Id., at 132-35, 141, 148-49, 162. 
51 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan 75 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991). 
52 Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey 144 (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986). See also Barbara Malony, Activism Among Women in the Taisho Coitton Textile 
Industry, in Gail Lee Bernstein (ed.), Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945 217, at 232 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) (“Girls’ salaries were extremely low.”). 
53 A mistake scholars of Japanese history have made elsewhere as well, whether 
when they write about women specifically, see Ramseyer, supra note 48, or when they 
write about peasants generally, see Richard J. Smethurst, Agricultural Development and 
Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
54 Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 332. 
55 Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 50, 72 (translation by M. Ramseyer). 
 I think I’ll head for the sunshine,  
I think I’ll head for the young ones. 
I may have left home saying I’d reel thread, 
but now I’m reeling in guys instead. 
8. Other evidence of efficiency wages. Even if workers earned high wages, 
they need not have earned “efficiency wages.” Instead, perhaps they just 
earned wages that compensated them for unusual disamenities. Several 
aspects of the record, however, suggest that the cotton spinning workers 
did earn efficiency rather than market-clearing wages. First, the workers 
recalled their jobs fondly. Had they earned market-clearing wages for 
harsh work, few would have remembered their factory years with the 
affection that Yamamoto found.  
Second, the workers earned a premium over their shadow agricultural 
wage that held relatively steady (Table 8). Because the demands for 
agricultural and textile products moved independently, market-clearing 
wages in the two industries would not have moved in tandem. 
Notwithstanding, in Japan the ratio of textile to agricultural wages did 
hold fairly constant: textile workers earned double or triple the 
agricultural wage. Even when their employers’ profits fell, their wage 
tended to hold firm. It moved independently of textile firm profits but in 
tandem with agricultural wages, and it did so precisely because it was an 
efficiency wage56—because the employers found it important to give their 
workers a large incentive not to shirk.  
Third, the textile firms offered labor contracts that in other ways 
corroborated how hard they tried to create incentives for their employees 
not to shirk. Most dramatically, many firms withheld part of their 
workers’ wages as performance bonds. As it had been for many 
indentured servants in the Americas,57 part of a textile worker’s pay was 
contingent on her satisfactorily completing her contract.58 If she shirked, 
the firm fired her and kept the bond; if she worked well and completed 
her contract, it paid her the bond when she quit. As one might expect, 
56 Fujino, Fujino & 0no, supra note 6, at 22. 
57 Stanley L. Engerman, Servants to Slaves to Servants: Contract Labour and European 
Expansion, in P.C. Emer (ed.), Colonialism and Migration: Indentured Labour Before and After 
Slavery 263, 268-69 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986) 
58 See Chuo, supra note 44, at 67-68 (1929); Nobuhiko Murakami, Meiji josei shi [A 
History of Meiji Women] 135 (Tokyo: Riron sha, 1971). 
 workers hated these contractual provisions.59 Only firms that found it 
usually hard to monitor their workers would have demanded contracts 
that placed them in as disadvantageous a position as did these. 
 
 
Table 8: The Price and Quantity of Labor  
in Cotton Spinning  
 
 A. B. C. D. 
 Daily  Hourly Spin/  Quantity 
 (current ¥) (constant sen) agri. person-days) 
1890 .08 2.22  2,762 
1892 .09 2.71 1.37 4,984 
1894 .10 2.95 1.43 7,842 
1896 .12 2.85 1.47 9,405 
1898 .16 3.27 1.17 15,413 
 
1900. .19 3.96 1.61 15,236 
1902 .22 4.10 1.71 16,933 
1904 .22 4.07 1.75 13,952 
1906 .25 4.02 1.84 20,153 
1908 .27 4.13 1.90 17,999 
 
1910 .29 4.68 2.14 23,263 
1912 .32 4.38 1.65 25,200 
1914 .33 4.79 2.21 29,271 
1916 .33 4.74 2.08 32,616 
1918 .47 4.10 1.57 29,415 
 
59 See Noshomu sho (ed.), Menshi boseki shokko jijo [Conditions of Factory Workers in 
Cotton Spinning] 99 (Tokyo: Noshomu sho, 1903). 
 Table 8 cont.: 
 
1920 1.31 8.95 2.74 34,103 
1922 1.30 9.49 2.38 41,885 
1924 1.29 10.26 2.38 35,627 
1926 1.30 10.70 2.38 45,118 
1928 1.35 11.76 2.83 38,720 
 
1930 1.16 13.97 2.56 33,710 
1932 .85 11.16 2.79 33,197 
1934 .77 9.62 2.43 38,830 
1936 .73 8.76 2.01 40,158 
 
Notes: 
(A) Mean daily wage in yen for female workers in cotton spinning sector, 
current prices. 
(B) Mean hourly wage in sen (¥l/100) for female workers in cotton 
spinning sector, constant 1934-36 prices. 
(C) Mean annual wage for female workers in cotton spinning sector, 
divided by mean annual wage for female workers in agricultural industry. 
(D) 1000 person-days worked by female laborers in spinning sector. 
 
Sources: Calculated on the basis of data from Shozaburo Fujino, Shino 
Fujino & Akira 0no, Choki keizai tokei: Sen’i kogyo [Long-Term Economic 
Statistics: The Textile Industry] 27, 256-77 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
1979); Takahiko Hashimoto, Nippon menshiseki gyo shi nempo [A Time Line 
for the Japanese Cotton Yarn Spinning Industry] (Tokyo: Bunka shi nempyo 
seisaku kenkyu kai, 1935); Noshomu sho somukyoku tokeika (ed.), 
Noshomu tokei hyo [Agricultural and Commercial Statistics] (Tokyo: Noshomu 
sho somukyoku tokeika, various years); Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda, 
Nobuyuki Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada, Minoru Kumazaki, Yoichi 
Shinoya & Ryoshin Minami, Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic 
Statistics: Prices] 134-36 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1967); Takejiro 
Shindo, Mengyo rodo sanko tokei [Reference Statistics Regarding Labor in the 
Cotton Industry] 500-03 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1958); Matsuji 
Umemura, Saburo Yamada, Yujiro Hayami, Nobuyuki Takamatsu, & 
Minoru Kumazaki, Choki keizai tokei: Norin gyo [Long-term Economic 
Statistics: Agriculture and Forestry] 220-21 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
1966). 
 B. Cartels as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:  
1. Introduction. Return, then, to the basic question: if the Boren firms 
could not earn monopoly rents, why did they coordinate production cuts? 
The answer, I suggest, derives from the principal-agent slack in corporate 
governance: absent a cartel, managers would have found it difficult 
credibly to commit to keeping the firm’s efficiency wage regime. In turn, 
that difficulty derived from four constraints to the contractual structure of 
the pre-war cotton spinning firms: 
1. The firm’s managers often needed to raise funds from a broad 
range of investors.  
2. The firm needed to respond to demand shocks primarily by 
cutting production rather than wages.  
3. Investors could obtain only noisy information (a) about the 
wages that their managers paid laborers, and (b) about the 
demand curve that the industry faced.  
4. Managers hesitated to run the plant at less than full capacity. 
Take each of these constraints in turn. 
 
2. Dispersed ownership. Because cotton spinning firms faced significant 
economies of scale (Table 9), many could raise the large amounts they 
needed only by issuing stock to a wide spectrum of investors. Together, 
these firms accounted for a major part of the trades on the Tokyo and the 
Osaka stock exchanges.60 Had they been able to attract money from the 
large conglomerates (the zaibatsu), perhaps they could have avoided 
widely dispersed stock holdings. Whatever the reason, however, those 
conglomerates chose not to invest heavily in cotton spinning (Table 10). 
The firms thus often had little choice but to build publicly held firms. 
 
3. Demand shock responses. For reasons explained above (Section 
IV.A.5.), spinning firms could minimize their long-term labor costs only if 
they responded to demand shocks by cutting production rather than 
wages. Because of the monitoring and metering problems in the industry, 
they minimized their wage bill by paying efficiency wages; because most 
workers came from the farm, they paid efficiency wages only by paying a 
steady premium above the agricultural wage; because the demand for 
60 See generally Osaka kabushiki torihiki sho (ed.), Okabu 50-nenshi [50-Year History of 
the OSE] (Osaka: Osaka kabushiki torihiki sho, 1928); Tokyo kabushiki torihiki sho (ed.) 
Tokyo kabushiki torihiki sho [The Tokyo Stock Exchange] (Tokyo: Keizai shimbun sha, 1916). 
 agricultural and textile labor moved independently, they could not cut 
wages without cutting their efficiency wage premium.  
4. Noisy information. (a) Wages. Public investors in the spinning firms 
had only noisy information about their firm’s wage scales. Had the firm 
paid its workers a straight daily wage, a straight seniority based wage, or 
a straight piece-rate contract, the investors would have had clean 
information. Their managers could have reported the scale they paid, and 
they could then have hired an independent auditor to verify the report. 
Most cotton spinning firms, however, blended seniority wages with 
piece-rate wages.61 A pure fixed or seniority-based contract created 
incentive problems: workers had less reason to work hard, and more 
reason to shirk. A pure piece-rate contract created metering and quality 
problems: (i) cotton spinning involved too much team production to 
permit a manager to meter individual output cleanly and readily, and (ii) 
piece-rate contracts induced workers to lower the quality of the output 
they produced. To mitigate these problems, most cotton-spinning firms 
blended the two contractual forms: they paid a worker by her team’s 
output, but on an individualized per-unit scale that depended on how the 
manager generally appraised the pace and quality of her work. As a 
result, a manager rated each worker’s skill and diligence. He gauged the 
quality and quantity of each worker’s output, and adjusted it from time to 
time as warranted. In turn, she could increase her pay both by inducing 
her team to increase its production (thereby increasing her own units of 
output), and by impressing her supervisor (thereby increasing her per-
unit wage). 
Investors received only noisy information about all this for two 
reasons: the factory hired new workers regularly, and the investors could 
not readily gauge whether a manager promoted his workers on the per-
unit scale at the optimal pace. To create the right incentives for their 
workers, the investors had to delegate discretion to their manager; in the 
process, however, they necessarily left themselves vulnerable. If a 
manager wanted to cheat on the firm’s efficiency wages, he could promote 
his workers too slowly; if he wanted to waste firm resources, he could 
promote them too generously. Should he promote workers either too 
quickly or too slowly, investors would learn that fact only much later, if 
they learned it all. Eventually, they might discover that they were paying 
61 Riyuemon Uno, Shokko chingin shiharai no shin hoho [A New Means of Paying Factory 
Workers] (Osaka: Kogyo kyoiku kai, 1913); Hosei, supra note 46, at 160-89. Tsurumi, supra 
note 49, at 148, claims that firms generally used pure piece-rate contracts for women, but 
this claim is belied by her own account of the many discretionary adjustments made. 
 higher wages than they needed to pay, or that they were incurring higher 
monitoring costs because their spartan wages had raised employee 
shirking. Alternatively, though, they might never know. Firms fail for a 
myriad of reasons, and many investors never learn why; ex post, investors 
often have trouble disentangling why a firm did so poorly. The managers 
responsible may have long since left anyway. 
(b) Demand curve. If investors lacked clean information about their own 
wage scales, they also lacked clean information about the industry’s 
demand curve. They knew their own firm’s sales, granted. Yet with only 
that information they could not distinguish between (i) a fall in industry-
wide demand and (ii) a fall in demand specific to their firm. These two 
problems, however, dictated radically different responses: the former 
dictated production cuts, while the latter required a product change to 
meet consumer tastes. Absent industry-wide information, investors could 
not distinguish the two.62  
5. Managerial reluctance to cut production. Even where investors would 
have wanted their manager to cut production, a manager sometimes had 
an incentive not to do so. To see why, suppose first that he had short-term 
horizons. Many probably did, for the shortage in well-trained managers 
enabled people who wanted to switch jobs to switch easily. For them, pre-
war Japan was not the Japan of “lifetime employment.” Suppose too that a 
manager discovered that industry-wide demand had fallen. If he either 
operated the plant at a loss or idled part of it, investors would notice. If he 
kept the plant at full capacity and kept it in the black by cutting wages, 
investors would not notice—at least for some time. To cut the short-term 
wage bill, he needed only to slow the rate at which he promoted his 
workers. In the long run, by lowering the efficiency wage premium the 
firm paid, he would increase shirking and raise the firm’s wage bill. In the 
short run, he could avoid an investigation of his managerial activities—
and the short run can often last a long time.  
This problem stemmed from the noisy information and collective 
action problems the firm’s investors faced. Assume—counter-factually—
that a single investor with perfect information owned each cotton 
spinning firm. If industry-wide demand fell, the investor could order his 
manager to cut capacity. If the manager instead cut wages, he could fire 
62 Price information on yarns would not yield this information because of the broad 
fluctuations in prices during these years. See Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda, Nobuyuki 
Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada, Minoru Kumazaki, Yoichi Shinoya & Ryoshin Minami, 
Choki keizai tokei: Bukka [Long-Term Economic Statistics: Prices] 134-36 (Tokyo: Toyo keizai 
shimpo sha, 1967). 
 him. Now assume—more realistically—that investors had noisy and 
incomplete information, and that each owned only a small share of the 
firm. Two problems ensued. First, because of their coarse information sets, 
investors could not distinguish industry-wide slumps from firm-specific 
declines. Second, because of their collective-action problems, they had 
little incentive to intervene in their firm unless they received strong 
signals that their managers might have misbehaved.63  
To protect his tenure at a firm, a manager had somehow to insure that 
investors received no strong signals that he may have mismanaged it. 
Should he either run the plant in the red or idle part of it, he sent just such 
a signal. Investors would sometimes then have found it cost-effective to 
intervene and investigate. If he had idled the plant, he could have done so 
either (a) because of an industry-wide slump, or (b) because of his own 
poor performance. If the investors could obtain perfect information, he 
would not worry. The investors would have absolved him and left. If 
investors could obtain only noisy and incomplete information, however, 
then even an honest and able manager faced a nontrivial risk of discharge 
or demotion. In such a world, he often did better if he could send no 
strong signals that investors might interpret unfavorably.  
6. The solution. Firms in the Japanese cotton spinning industry solved 
these problems through the Boren. They did so in two steps. First, they 
pooled information about industry-wide demand. By contributing 
information about their own firm s, they together generated the data that 
let them gauge the extent they suffered from industry-wide demand 
shocks. They could then have forwarded that information to their 
investors, and—if their investors faced no collective-action problems—
those investors could have determined whether the firm should cut 
capacity. Absent collective-action problems, the firms needed the Boren 
for information pooling, and for nothing more. 
Yet the investors in many cotton spinning firms did face collective 
action problems, and it was to mitigate those problems that the Boren not 
only pooled information but also ordered capacity cuts. If privately held 
firms could trust their owner to decide whether to cut production, 
publicly traded firms could replicate that result by delegating the decision 
to a third party, the Boren. In giving Boren officers that authority, 
managers committed themselves to enforcing their firm’s efficiency wage 
63 True, because the stock was listed on the national exchanges, they could easily sell 
their interests even if they received only weak signals that their managers had 
misbehaved. Given that their sale price would have incorporated those signals, though, 
they would have found the sale small consolation. 
 strategy, and investors reduced the cost of verifying that their manager 
had acted appropriately. In effect, managers and owners assigned the 
Boren the task not just of pooling information, but of interpreting it and 
enforcing that interpretation as well. In a world without antitrust, no one 
incurred legal risks in fixing quantity; in an internationally competitive 
industry with many spinners from many countries, neither did anyone 
incur many technological risks by sharing information. 
The Boren membership patterns loosely corroborate this hypothesis. 
During the early decades of the century, not all cotton-spinning firms 
joined the Boren. Of those that listed their shares on either the Tokyo or 
Osaka stock exchange, though, nearly all did. All such firms faced the 
principal-agent and collective-action problems described above, and most 
mitigated them through the Boren. Only privately held firms faced less of 
a problem, and primarily only they avoided the Boren.64 
That managers needed to tie their hands also explains some of the 
more bizarre aspects of the agreements. Recall the details: the Boren often 
required firms to idle specified percentages of their capacity, but never 
banned them from augmenting that capacity (Table 2). If Boren members 
hoped to raise prices, this made no sense. Without a way to limit new 
capacity, they could not have cut production and could not have raised 
prices.  
In contrast, suppose that the Boren firms negotiated their agreement to 
mitigate the agency slack between investors and their managers. More 
specifically, suppose that they wanted to induce managers to idle 
machines whenever the investors would have wanted them idled. The 
Boren agreements addressed the problem precisely. The firms did not use 
the Boren to ban investments in new capacity because most of the firms 
had already assigned that decision to the investors directly. They did so 
64 Of the 11 non-Boren cotton spinning firms listed in Zaisei, supra note 23, at 210, 
none had listed stock. Although Nippon kangyo, supra note 7, 58, lists two muslin firms 
outside the Boren and both had publicly traded stock, Shigeru Kano (ed.), Tokyo kabushiki 
torihiki jo [Tokyo Stock Exchange] 125 (Tokyo: Hideshi Kano, 1933), lists these firms as not 
being cotton spinning firms. It is difficult to differentiate cotton spinning firms on the 
basis of name alone. If we eliminate firms that seem to have specialized in flax and wool, 
however, as of 1925 the only non-Boren cotton spinning firm on either the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange or the Osaka Stock Exchange was one Naniwa boshoku. On Boren 
membership, see Dai-Nippon supra note 18; on the stock listings, see Osaka, supra note 60; 
Tokyo, supra note 60; Kano, supra note 64. 
 by regularly draining the firm of cash.65  Through high dividend policies, 
they insured that they often could build new plants only by raising new 
capital. In the process, the managers credibly commited themselves to the 
discipline of the capital market on questions of new investment 66 
 
 
Table 9: Scale Economies in Cotton Spinning 
 
A. Relative Costs: 
 
Spindles/ Wages  Amenities Operating 
Factory  Materials  (labor) (labor) Costs Total  
 5,000 21.77  104.14  16.92 22.37 165.20 
10,000 21.77 73.59  11.95 19.34 126.65 
20,000 21.77 57.66 9.35 18.84 107.64 
30,000 21.77 51.53 8.37 18.33 100.00 
40,000 21.77 49.25 8.00 18.09  97.11 
50,000 21.77 47.97 7.79 17.93  95.46 
60,000 21.77 47.14  7.66 17.83  94.40 
 
B. Firm Size: 
 
Number of No. of Total 
Spindles  Firms (%) Spindles (%) 
  Under    10,000 10 (12.5)      51,268   (0.4) 
 10,000-   49,999 25 (31.3)    614,820   (5.0) 
 50,000-   99,999 14 (17.5)    932,828   (7.5) 
100,000-299,999 20 (25.0) 3,040,996 (24.6) 
300,000-499,999  3   (3.7) 1,050,604   (8.5) 
500,000 and over   8 (10.0) 6,668,248 (54.0) 
 
Note: In A, costs are indexed by expenses for 30,000-spindle factories, and 
are for No. 20 yarn. In B, firm size is as of 1937. 
 
 
65 For evidence of high dividend rates in the spinning industry, see Dai-Nippon 
boseki rengo kai, Menshi boseki jijo sanko sho [Reference Regarding Cotton Yarn Spinning 
Matters] (0saka: Dai-Nippon boseki rengo kai, various years). 
66 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 650 (1984). 
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Source: Keizo Seki, Nihon mengyo ron [A Theory of the Japanese Cotton 
Industry] 204, 473 (Tokyo:  Tokyo daigaku shuppan kai, 1954). 
 
 
 
Table 10:  Zaibatsu Investments in 
Cotton Spinning 
 
A. Zaibatsu Holdings in Spinning Firms 
The Mitsui Zaibatsu 
 Mitsui Firm Mitsui share 
Textile firm shareholdings  spindles of spindles 
Kanebo  6.71% 615,192 41,279 
Kinka boseki 41.36 144,624 59,816 
Toyoda boshoku    5.97  79,824   4,765 
Tenma boshoku 48.58  65,792 31,962 
Utsumi boshoku 48.97  72,500 35,503 
Tokyo mosurin 48.52  79,128 38,393 
Kikui boshoku   1.43  62,428  768 
 
The Mitsubishi Zaibatsu 
 Mitsubishi s/g Mitsubishi share 
Nagasaki boshoku  2.79  98,656  2,753 
Fuji gasu boseki  1.43 502,104  7,180 
 
The Sumitomo Zaibatsu 
 Sumitomo s/g Sumitomo share 
0saka godo boseki  0.67 427,524  2,864 
 
The Yasuda Zaibatsu 
 Yasuda s/g Yasuda share 
0saka godo boseki   0.86 427,524  3,677 
 
 Table 10 cont.: 
B. Zaibatsu Share of Total Industry Spindles (6,529,394) 
 
 Spindles  Percent  
Mitsui   212,486 3.25 
Mitsubishi  9,933 0.15 
Sumitomo  2,864 0.04 
Yasuda  3,677 0.06 
 
TOTAL   228,960 3.50 
 
Notes: Figures are from Takahashi (cited below) where available, and 
from stockholder lists in company semi-annual reports where not. Mitsui 
ownership in Kinka and Tokyo mosurin are Takahashi’s estimates. Stock 
classes are combined on an equal basis. Figures are as of approximately 
1928. 
 
Sources: Kamekichi Takahashi, Nippon zaibatsu no kaibo [An Analysis of the 
Japanese Zaibatsu] (Tokyo:  Chuo koron sha, 1930); semi-annual company 
reports for Kikui boshoku, Tenma boshoku, and 0saka bodo. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Just once, you should come see a farming or fishing village. 
You won't find a single girl. All you’ll see are shivelled old 
grannies. The girls are all gone, left the village for work. ... We 
guys are left, but we’re lonely. Real lonely. Even suppose I can 
take the loneliness. How am I going to find a wife?  I want a wife 
so bad I’m going crazy. But no girl’ll marry a poor farmer 
anymore. Even when they come back to the village from the 
factories, they’ve turned completely high-class. With their hair 
done up and perfumed and all, they won’t even look at us.  
 
It was a letter to the editor of a Tokyo daily newspaper.67  And it 
captured at least some of the economic impact of the textile industry. 
Having made a minor fortune in the mills, the women had raised their 
67 Quoted in Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 121. Of course, there may have other 
reasons factory women would not give this man the time of day—there usually are. Of 
the 1,536 women in spinning factories surveyed in 1927, 801 said they hoped to marry a 
farmer. See Chuo, supra note 44, at 22-23. 
 sights. It is not what one reads in the tirades against the mills so popular 
in the fashionable histories. But the fashionable histories miss the 
industry’s effect on female incomes. “It was harder work at first than I had 
done before,” recalled one old woman. As a young girl, she had left her 
hometown for a silk reeling factory. “But since there were lots of us and 
we all worked together, it was kind of fun. And besides, it paid better.”68   
Peasants may be poor, Donald McCloskey reminds us, but they are not 
fools. They respond to market incentives, and they respond rationally. To 
induce them to work in the new spinning factories, the owners had to 
make it worth their while; to induce them to work hard in the new mills, 
they had to make it lucrative. The firms did so by paying peasant women 
double or triple their market-clearing wage. Largely, their scheme 
worked. Rather than lose such a well-paying job, the young women 
worked hard. 
Within the firm, that which promoted the welfare of its managers did 
not always promote the welfare of its investors. In particular, given the 
noisy information and the diversified ownership patterns in the industry, 
managers sometimes had an incentive to respond to demand shocks 
suboptimally—to cheat on the firm’s high wage strategy rather than to cut 
plant capacity. To commit credibly to cutting capacity rather than wages, 
the managers placed the firm in the Boren. In the process, they tied their 
hands—they assigned the decision about wage and production cuts to a 
third party.  
Although the Boren adopted the appearance of a cartel, it 
accomplished something radically diferent. Although the spinning firms 
used it to coordinate production cutbacks, they did not use it to earn 
monopoly rents. Instead, they used it to lower operating costs. Whether of 
Japan or elsewhere, scholars too readily conclude that if it looks like a 
monopoly rent and quacks like a monopoly rent, it must be a monopoly 
rent. Like ducks, like rents: the Japanese spinning firms illustrate again 
how wrong that approach can be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Quoted in Yamamoto, supra note 37, at 336. 
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